Civilians, Service-Members, and the Death Penalty:  The Failure of Article 25A to Require Twelve-Member Panels in Capital Trials for Non-Military Crimes by Choa, Jonathan
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 70 Issue 5 Article 34 
2002 
Civilians, Service-Members, and the Death Penalty: The Failure of 
Article 25A to Require Twelve-Member Panels in Capital Trials for 
Non-Military Crimes 
Jonathan Choa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan Choa, Civilians, Service-Members, and the Death Penalty: The Failure of Article 25A to Require 
Twelve-Member Panels in Capital Trials for Non-Military Crimes, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2065 (2002). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/34 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Civilians, Service-Members, and the Death Penalty: The Failure of Article 25A to 
Require Twelve-Member Panels in Capital Trials for Non-Military Crimes 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Christine for her endless 
support in this project. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/34 
CIVILIANS, SERVICE-MEMBERS, AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: THE FAILURE OF
ARTICLE 25A TO REQUIRE TWELVE-MEMBER
PANELS IN CAPITAL TRIALS FOR NON-
MILITARY CRIMES
Jonathan Choa*
If the twelve Apostles on their twelve Thrones, must try us in our
eternal State, good Reason hath the Law to appoint the Number of
Twelve to try our Temporal.'
INTRODUCTION
On December 28, 2001, President Bush signed the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 ("NDAA"). Section
582 added Article 25a to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ"). It states:
In a case in which the accused may be sentenced to a penalty of
death, the number of members shall be not less than 12, unless 12
members are not reasonably available because of physical conditions
or military exigencies, in which case the convening authority shall
specify a lesser number of members not less than five, and the court
may be assembled and the trial held with not less than the number
of members so specified. In such a case, the convening authority
shall make a detailed written statement, to be appended to the
record, stating why a greater number of members were not
reasonably available.2
Before the amendment, only five members were necessary.' Now,
at least twelve are required except where physical conditions or
military exigencies make convening twelve members unreasonable. In
2002, it is possible that President Bush will have to decide to approve
the death warrants of two soldiers, Dwight Loving and Ronald Gray,
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Christine for her endless support in this project.
1. Giles Duncombe, Trials per Pas 79 (6th ed. 1725).
2. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L No. 107-
107, § 582,115 Stat. 1012,1124 (2001).
3. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2000).
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or grant them clemency.4 Panels of fewer than twelve convicted them
both, but their respective convictions and sentences have been upheld
throughout a lengthy appeals process.5 They could become the first
people executed by the military since 1961 when Private John Arthur
Bennett was hanged outside of Fort Leavenworth for raping and
attempting to murder an eleven-year old Australian girl.6 Since then
only one other soldier has been close to execution, but President
Kennedy commuted his death sentence to life.7
The legislative change in panel size and the possibility of military
executions combine to focus a bright light on the military justice
system. The current war on terrorism and the possibility of military
tribunals have also increased the attention given to military justice.
The time has come to reevaluate the way soldiers are tried in capital
cases in the military before the first soldiers in forty years are
executed. Six soldiers currently sit on death row. Loving and Gray
have seemingly exhausted their appeals. The other four, Wade
Walker, Kenneth Parker, William Kreutzer, and Jessie Quintanilla,9
have yet to have their first appeals heard. All have been accused of
murder, not uniquely military crimes such as spying or aiding the
enemy.
Unlike soldiers, civilians charged with capital offenses are
guaranteed twelve jurors in all jurisdictions that have the death
penalty, including the federal jurisdiction. Article 25a was meant to
remedy this problem. This Note examines that dichotomy and the
new legislation designed to eliminate it. This Note argues that Article
25a, the weight of two hundred years of tradition to the contrary, was
correct in requiring at least twelve members on a panel in military
capital trials. However, Article 25a does not effectively create a
twelve-member requirement. This Note offers an amendment that
would plug Article 25a's loophole and require twelve-member panels
in all capital, military trials for civilian crimes.
4. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. This process could be lengthy
and may not occur for some time.
5. See Loving v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 342 (2001) (denying certiorari); Gray v.
United States, 532 U.S. 919 (2001) (denying certiorari).
6. Cody M. Weston, Note, United States v. Loving: The Resurrection of Military
Capital Punishment, 77 Or. L. Rev. 365,365 (1998).
7. Dwight H. Sullivan, The Last Line of Defense: Federal Habeas Review of
Military Death Penalty Cases, 144 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 4 n.10 (1994).
8. It should be noted that the military tribunals proposed by President Bush
would operate independently of the rules and standards of military justice. See Neil A.
Lewis, Rules on Tribunal Require Unanimity on Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28,
2001, at Al.
9. These cases are not discussed in depth because their first appeals have not yet
been filed with their respective Courts of Criminal Appeals.
10. See Raymond Bonner, Push Is On for Larger Jury In Military Capital Cases,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 2001, at A12 (reporting that every state that has the death
penalty and the federal government require twelve jurors).
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This Note in general, and Part H specifically, focus on the civilian,
federal system. The federal system presents the best comparison
because Congress makes the rules for federal courts" and the
military. 2 In the limited scope of this Note, it would not be fully
possible to analyze the way the death penalty is administered in all
thirty-eight states that have capital punishment. 3 The disadvantage of
this limited focus is that most capital cases occur in state courts. Also,
rights guaranteed to a defendant facing the death penalty in a federal
trial are not necessarily guaranteed to a defendant in a state court.
Part I describes the major historical developments in panel size,
capital punishment, incorporation of civilian protections in military
proceedings, and procedures for charging and prosecuting the
accused. This part begins by outlining the history and development of
the panel's size and the death penalty from the Founding through the
inception of the UCMJ. 4 This part will illustrate that the original
rationale for requiring only five panel members is no longer
applicable. It then examines prior incorporation of civilian
protections into military law to show that previous incorporations of
civilian protections have not hindered the military from enforcing
good order and discipline"-the standard that all provisions of the
UCMJ must meet. 6 To provide readers with a helpful background of
military justice, this part concludes with a description of how
defendants are charged and prosecuted in the military. 7
Part II is an analysis of the federal and military systems, focusing on
three key aspects of capital defense. To give this analysis a practical
context, this part begins by detailing the facts of three recent military
capital cases, with an emphasis on the crimes' "'civilian" nature. This
part, in addition to illustrating the problems with the military panel,"
also examines the quality of defense," and the appellate procedure2"
in the military and federal systems. These last two sections are
designed to assess any argument that the military can use less than
twelve-member panels because it adequately protects the defendant
with other safeguards. This part focuses on the federal system, but
this narrow focus does not diminish the comparison. The relevant
state cases on jury composition are largely controlled by Supreme
Court decisions since the right to a jury trial is secured by the
11. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
12. Id art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
13. See Bonner, supra note 10, at A12.
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pmbl. (2000) [hereinafter MCMI.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See infra Part II.D.
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Constitution. 21  Likewise, because of the constitutional right to
counsel,22 the minimum standards for effective counsel decided by the
Supreme Court are also binding upon the state courts. The federal
appellate procedure is also relevant to all state death penalty cases,
because habeas corpus proceedings can be heard in federal courts. 2
Part III argues that twelve-member panels are necessary in military
capital trials for civilian crimes but not adequately provided for in the
new legislation. This part begins by arguing the context for adopting
the five-member panels in 1786 has never been properly reevaluated
and is no longer applicable.24 This part then refutes the argument that
introducing civilian protections into the military setting is detrimental
by discussing previous incorporations of civilian rights that have not
harmed the military.25 It then argues guaranteed twelve-member
panels are necessary because of the inability of the military justice
system to protect defendants' rights as effectively as the federal
system. 26  Twelve-member panels can better protect a defendant
because the vote to convict and sentence to death must be unanimous
in the military.27 The more panel members, the more likely the
defense is to get a dissenting vote.2 The reason why military justice
must meet a higher standard in capital cases is because death is
different than other non-capital punishments. 29 The Note concludes
that the new legislation does not effectively institute a twelve-member
panel requirement" and offers a solution to ensure the protection of
soldiers' rights while maintaining the integrity of the military justice
system.3'
21. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI.
22 Id. amend. VI.
23. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Michael E. Tigar, Federal Appeals: Jurisdiction and
Practice § 3.14 (2d ed. 1993); see also Edward P. Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First
Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court 93-94, 493-95
(1998) (discussing the development of habeas corpus and the death penalty).
24. See infra Part III.A.1.
25. See infra Part III.A.2.
26. See infra Part III.A.3. The same argument could be extended to twelve jurors
in all courts-martial where the accused could face a substantial amount of jail time;
however, this Note specifically address Article 25a. Non-capital cases are beyond the
scope of this Note. See infra text accompanying notes 305-07.
27. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 52, 10 U.S.C. § 852 (2000).
28. See infra text accompanying note 356.
29. This might lead to the conclusion that all military capital trials should have
twelve-member panels, but that is not the contention of this Note. It focuses only on
soldiers accused of violating Article 188 (murder) and, to a lesser extent, Article
120(a) (rape). In strictly military crimes like spying or aiding the enemy, the interests
of good order and discipline may supersede the need to protect defendants' rights.
This is justified because non-military murder affects a few people, while spying or
aiding the enemy could endanger a whole platoon, corps, or even the country.
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Part III.C.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND WORKINGS OF MILITARY JUSTICE
The first section of this part describes the development of the panel
size in military capital cases.32 It is important to scrutinize the context
in which five-member panels were adopted in 1786 in order to
determine if the relevance of this historical rationale is still relevant or
should be reevaluated. This part's subsequent examination of the
military's prior incorporation of civilian protections is important to
illustrate that incorporation can be done without hurting good order
and discipline.33 If other protections, like Miranda warnings and
aggravating factors used to determine the death penalty, have been
successfully incorporated, then there is good reason to believe that
twelve-member panels can be incorporated as well. The final section
describes how a service member is charged and prosecuted in order to
better understand some of the problems in the system.'
A. History of Military Justice
This section examines the development of the panel size and death
penalty solely in the Army. The Navy did not receive its own written
rules of governance until after five-member panels were created in the
Army.35 The Marine Corps did not have its own rules; it was governed
by the rules of the Navy when at sea and by the rules of the Army
when ashore 6.3  The Air Force did not exist in 1786. The purpose of
this section is to set the foundation for examining whether the
rationale for adopting five-member panels in 1786 is still valid today.
The history will show that thirteen-member panels were required
before the change in 1786, and that the rationale for the change is no
longer relevant.
1. Number of Panel Members
Unlike federal and state statutes for capital trials,- the military has
required only a minimum of five members in its trial equivalent, the
general court-martial, even for capital trials.-' This was not always the
case. The first national Articles of War to govern the Army were
enacted on June 30, 1775 and amended on November 7, 1775.39
32. See infra Part I.A.
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. See infra Part I.C.
35. John F. O'Connor, Don't Know Much About Histor': Tile Constitution,
Historical Practice, and the Death Penalty Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 52 U. Miami
L. Rev. 177, 193 (1997).
36. See Dwight H. Sullivan, Playing the Numbers: Court-Martial Panel Size and
the Military Death Penalty, 158 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 12 n.43 (1998).
37. See Bonner, supra note 10 (writing that every state that has the death penalty
and federal death penalty legislation require twelve jurors).
38. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2000).
39. William B. Aycock & Seymour W. Wurfel, Military Law Under the Uniform
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Article XXXIII of the Articles of War of 1775 required that no
general court-martial "shall consist of a less number than thirteen,
none of which shall be under the degree of a commissioned officer."40
The number of panel members was based on British practice.4
After the Revolutionary War, Secretary of War Henry Knox
presented a proposal to amend the Articles of War to require only
five officers in a general courts-martial.42 Knox was concerned that
the downsizing of an army, coupled with its sprawl over distant
garrisons, would make it impossible to impanel thirteen commissioned
officers.43 He suggested "that five should be sufficient, in cases where
a greater number cannot be obtained."'  Knox also argued that
discipline would suffer if offenders could not be given a speedy trial.
He cited the opinion of "many judicious officers.., that the discipline
of the army would have been bettered... had the courts martial been
composed of a less number of members. The sickness or absence of
members frequently protracted the trial to the most inordinate
lengths, by which the service was extremely injured."4 5 Knox thought
a written record of the evidence and proceedings, as well as an
independent review, protected against "unfair practices. 4 6
Congressmen Arthur St. Clair, Henry Lee, and John Lawrance took
up Knox's proposal on March 9, 1786.47 Congress adopted their
report on March 30, 1786, without any recorded debate, and repealed
section 14 of the Articles of War of 1776.48 The amended Articles of
War established, "[g]eneral courts-martial may consist of any number
of commissioned officers from 5 to 13 inclusively; but they shall not
consist of less than 13, where that number can be convened without
manifest injury to the service. ' 49
Code of Military Justice 9-10 (Greenwood Press 1972) (1955).
40. American Articles of War of 1775, art. XXXIII, reprinted in William
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents app. at 956 (Gov't Printing Office 1920)
(1886).
41. Articles I and II of Section XV of the British Articles of War of 1765 stated,
"[a] General Court-martial in Our Kingdoms of Great Britain or Ireland, shall not
consist of less than Thirteen Commissioned Officers." British Articles of War of 1765,
reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40, app. at 942. Thirteen-member panels were also
adopted by Massachusetts to govern its militia. Article 32 of the Massachusetts
Articles of War stated, "[n]o General Court Martial shall consist of a less number
than thirteen [including the president], none of which shall be under the degree of a
Field Officer." Massachusetts Articles of War (1775), reprinted in Winthrop, supra
note 40, app. at 950.
42. 29 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774-1789, at 851 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., Gov't Printing Office 1933) (1785).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 851-52.
46. Id. at 852.
47. Id. at 854 n.1.
48. 30 Journals of the Continental Congress, supra note 42, at 145.
49. American Articles of War of 1786, art. 1, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40,
app. at 972. There must have been some debate on this amendment because the final
2070 [Vol. 70
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2. History of the Death Penalty
Understanding the actual crimes requiring administration of the
death penalty is important to understand the 1786 amendment. At
first, the American Articles of War of 1775 authorized the death
penalty for only three offenses: shamefully abandoning one's post,
disclosing or giving a false watchword, and compelling a senior officer
to surrender his command to the enemy. The revision of these
Articles of War several months later added two more capital offenses,
"striking or offering violence against a superior officer in the
execution of his office,"51 and "committing violence to any person
bringing provisions or other necessaries into camp."5' The amended
articles of 1776 authorized death for sixteen different offenses, all
military in nature 3  In 1863, when courts-martial were given
jurisdiction in time of war or rebellion over a host of crimes now
considered felonies, such as murder, robbery, arson, and
manslaughter, the number of offenses subject to capital punishment
expanded.' The punishment was to be at minimum the equivalent
punishment of the jurisdiction where the crime occurred. - If that
penalty was death, then the soldier could be executed.
In 1916, the Articles of War were revised again.-' Attacking a
person bringing supplies to camp, made a capital crime in 1776,1 was
made a non-capital offense.58 Military jurisdiction over the previously
mentioned civilian crimes was extended to cover peacetime as well as
war and rebellion,59 but the penalty was no longer connected to the
penalty of the jurisdiction, making these offenses non-capital.' Rape
and murder in time of war and rebellion, or when committed outside
the continental United States, were expressly made capital crimes."
3. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
In the 1940s, reformers began to clamor for a revision of the
Articles of War because of the abuses they perceived during World
War II.6 Studies by Congress and the separate military branches
version is slightly different than the one proposed by St. Clair, Lee, and Lawrance.
See 30 Journals of the Continental Congress, supra note 42, at 145.
50. O'Connor, supra note 35, at 184.
51. Id. at 185.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 184-85.
54. See id. at 189-90.
55. Id at 190.
56. Id at 191.
57. Id at 185.
58. Id. at 191-92.
59. Id at 192.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See William T. Generous, Jr., Swords and Scales: The Development of the
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discovered severe sentences, incompetent defense counsel, unlawful
command influence, and lack of qualified men to serve in courts-
martial.63  To solve these problems, Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal created a new committee with a mandate to design a whole
new body of law.' It was to accomplish three main goals:
(1) integrate the systems of the three services into a Uniform Code
of Military Justice; (2) make the new code a modern one, "with a
view to protecting the rights of those subject to the code and
increasing public confidence in military justice, without impairing
the performance of military functions"; and (3) improve the
arrangement and draftsmanship of the military justice statutes.65
After some congressional revision, the UCMJ was enacted on May 5,
1950. 6 When it became effective on May 31, 1951, the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force were governed for the first
time by the same articles.67 Article 16 kept the same minimum
requirement of five members for general courts-martial, but removed
the requirement, in place since 1786, that thirteen officers be
impaneled "where that number can be convened without manifest
injury to the service." The new article simply read, "general courts-
martial, consisting of-a military judge and not less than five
members. '69
The UCMJ removed geographical and wartime restrictions on
capital crimes and gave the military jurisdiction over "all enumerated
capital offenses no matter where or when the crime was committed. '70
Connected to this, the UCMJ eliminated the requirement that
commanders give accused soldiers to civilian authorities for trial if
requested by the victim.7 Felony murder was made a capital offense
when "the underlying felony was an actual or attempted burglary,
sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson. ' 72 Rape was also made a
capital offense no matter if it was committed during war or
peacetime.73 The UCMJ also made striking an officer in the execution
of his duties a non-capital offense as long as it occurred in peacetime.74
Uniform Code of Military Justice 24 (1973).
63. Id. at 16.
64. Id. at 34.
65. Id.
66. Aycock & Wurfel, supra note 39, at 15.
67. Id.
68. American Articles of War of 1786, art. 1, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40,
app. at 972; Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2000).
69. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16(1)(A).
70. O'Connor, supra note 35, at 196.
71. Id. at 197.
72. Id. at 196.
73. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 120.
74. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 90.
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B. Incorporation of Civilian Liberties in the Military
After passage of the UCMJ, various civil liberties of the civilian
justice system were incorporated into the military system. The civilian
judges that sat on the Court of Military Appeals, the highest military
appellate court, began to "import[] into the military most of the rights
of criminal defendants which expanded so dramatically in the post-
[World War Ifl period."'75 A string of cases began to expand civil
liberty protections for the soldiers.76 United States v. Matthews, and
United States v. Tempia78 are particularly important because of their
direct incorporation of protections from the civilian system, their
wide-ranging impact on how soldiers are prosecuted in the military,
and their seemingly minimal impact on good order and discipline.
1. United States v. Matthews
In United States v. Matthews, the defendant, who was convicted and
sentenced to death for the murder and rape of a woman in Germany,
had his death sentence overturned.79 The Court of Military Appeals
("CMA") ruled that the military death penalty as promulgated in the
UCMJ was unconstitutional because it did not require the panel
members to explicitly identify the aggravating factors relied upon in
the imposition of the death penalty.'0 The court's decision was based
upon the civilian precedent in Furman v. Georgia,." where the
Supreme Court held that the jury's sentencing discretion had to be
controlled in regards to the death penalty.8 The CMA did not go so
far as to hold the UCMJ unconstitutional, but it did prevent the
imposition of the death penalty. 3 The court, however, did suggest
that the President or Congress could remedy the defect by
75. James B. Jacobs, Socio-Legal Foundations of Civil-Military Relations 7
(1986).
76. See, e.g., Giles v. Secretary of the Army, 627 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(striking down compulsory urine tests because they were a form of self-
incrimination); United States v. Ware, 1 MJ. 282 (C.M.A. 1976) (limiting convening
authority's power to overrule the trial judge); United States v. Jordan, 1 MJ. 334
(C.M.A. 1976) (holding foreign searches are not exempt from the exacting standards
of search and seizure law); United States v. Douglas, 1 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1976)
(holding pre-trial transcripts from the Article 32 hearing were inadmissible at trial);
United States v. Courtney, 1 MJ. 438 (C.M.A. 1976) (striking down certain maximum
sentences).
77. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
78. 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967).
79. Matthews, 16 MJ. at 359,382.
80. Id. at 354, 379, 382 (holding that in light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), the statutory class was too broad in military capital punishment); see also John
S. Cooke, The Death Penalty in Courts-Martial: United States v. Matthews, 31 Fed. B.
News & J. 245, 246 (1984).
81. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8Z Matthews, 16 M.J. at 369 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
83. See Cooke, supra note 80, at 246.
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enumerating aggravating factors that must be present before the
accused can be sentenced to death.8' The administration of the death
penalty in the federal system required the finding of such aggravating
factors.85 President Ronald Reagan, in 1984, did just that in an
Executive Order creating Rules for Court-Martial 1004.86 This
required a unanimous finding that one aggravating factor, out of a
possible ten," be present and that admissible aggravating
circumstances outweigh any mitigating factors."
Dwight Loving was one of the first soldiers to be prosecuted under
this new rule. He was an Army private convicted of two murders and
sentenced to death. 9 Loving appealed to the Supreme Court arguing
the President did not have the authority to detail the aggravating
factors necessary to impose a sentence of death.90 He claimed this was
a violation of separation of powers because only Congress could
formulate laws regarding the military.91 The Supreme Court first
affirmed the CMA's decision in Matthews that Furman applied to the
military. 2  The Court then held in Loving that Congress lawfully
delegated its power to the President to prescribe the aggravating
factors.93
2. United States v. Tempia
In United States v. Tempia, a soldier was charged and convicted of
making obscene proposals to three young girls in a library bathroom.94
The CMA threw out the conviction because it was based on a
confession the defendant made without receiving an adequate
warning of his right to counsel as required in the recent civilian
decision Miranda v. Arizona.95 The Tempia case is remarkable for its
full incorporation of civilian protections into the military. The
accused had been advised as to his right to remain silent and the
purpose for which his statements could be used, but he was not told of
84. See Matthews, 16 M.J. at 380-81.
85. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591, 3592 (2000).
86. See Exec. Order No. 12,473,49 Fed. Reg. 17,152 (Apr. 13, 1984).
87. There are now eleven aggravating factors. MCM, supra note 16, Rules for
Court-Martial 1004.
88. See Exec. Order No. 12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,152.
89. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 751 (1996). Loving robbed two 7-
Eleven stores at gunpoint, robbed and killed two cab drivers, and attempted to rob
another. Id.
90. Id. at 751-52.
91. Id. at 754-55.
92. Id. at 754.
93. Id. at 773.
94. United States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249,252 (C.M.A. 1967).
95. Id. at 260. According to the Court in Miranda, a prosecution cannot use
statements resulting from custodial interrogation unless the prosecution demonstrates
the use of necessary procedural safeguards. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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his right to consult with an attorney. 6 This was enough to vacate the
conviction. 7 The prosecution argued the Miranda decision did not
apply to the military,9 and the defendant had been fully advised of his
rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ.99 The court rejected that
argument, stating, "our duty [is] to follow the interpretation by the
Supreme Court of the Constitution of the United States insofar as it is
not made expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable to
members of the armed forces."'" Tempia, despite its wide impact on
the system, has never been overruled for hurting good order and
discipline or for any other reason.' °1 In addition, Matthews did not
cripple the military's ability to sentence soldiers to death. The defect
was fixed and Loving and several other soldiers have since been
sentenced to death.102
C. Structure of the Military Justice System
This section explains the military process for charging and
prosecuting service members, which is very different from the federal
model. This presentation is important because many of the problems
in the military justice system stem from the intimate relationship
between the accuser and the trier of fact. These problems can be
better understood with background knowledge of the military process.
Under the UCMJ, infractions are first brought to the attention of
the commanding officer who has authority to issue non-judicial
punishment. 1 3 This commanding officer can refer it to the senior
commanding officer, who has summary court-martial jurisdiction."'
That commander can either administer non-judicial punishment or
refer it to a summary, special, or general court-martial.' t0
96. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. at 257.
97. Id. at 260.
98. Id. at 253.
99. Id. at 258. Article 31 contains the same warnings as Miranda about right to
silence and purpose of any statements made. However, it does not mention the right
to counsel. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 31,10 U.S.C. § 831 (2000).
100. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. at 260.
101. See generally United States v. Curtis, 52 M.J. 166 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United
States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Simoy, 50 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F.
1998); United States v. Murphy, 50 MJ. 4 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Loving v. Hart, 47 M.J.
438 (C.A.A.F. 1998); United States v. Thomas, 46 M.J. 311 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
102. A search for articles or commentaries criticizing the Matthews or Tempia
decision and alleging decreased good order and discipline yielded none.
103. Charles A. Shanor & Timothy P. Terrell, Military Law in a Nutshell 99 (1980).
Non-judicial punishment is designed to punish minor offenses without a court-martial
proceeding. Id. at 63-68; see also Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 15.
104. See Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 100. A summary court-martial, like
non-judicial punishment, is limited in the punishment that can be administered. Id. at
71; see also Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 20.
105. See Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 100. A special court-martial consists
of three members and is limited in the punishments it can administer. It cannot
administer capital punishment. See id. at 75; see also MCM, supra note 16, Rule for
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If a case is referred to a general court-martial, the only forum where
capital trials can be tried, 106 there must be a formal Article 32
investigation conducted by an investigating officer."° This functions
essentially as a grand jury. After this procedure, the investigating
officer prepares a report to the convening authority, the commander
who referred the case to the general court-martial. 10 The convening
authority then has the responsibility to appoint the court-martial
members, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney.0 9 The Judge
Advocate General ("TJAG"), who is responsible for directing the
members of his or her service branch's Judge Advocate General's
Corps ("JAGC"),"10 appoints the military judge of a general court-
martial or designates someone to do the task."'
The actual workings of a court-martial are nearly identical to a
federal criminal trial: The Federal Rules of Evidence apply"' as do
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, unless explicitly replaced by
the UCMJ or inconsistent with military justice."3  The major
difference is that a verdict requires only two-thirds of the panel
members. 14  However, in death penalty cases the verdict must be
unanimous in regards to the guilt, the presence of aggravating factors,
the balance between mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and
the sentence of death.115
The appeals process begins with approval of the verdict by the
convening authority. In capital cases, appeals then go to the Courts of
Criminal Appeals ("CCA") 116 and then to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces ("CAAF")."1 7 The Supreme Court can
review decisions from the CAAF on a writ of certiorari."' The
President must also approve all sentences of death." 9 Outside of this
Court-Martial 1301.
106. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 18.
107. See id. art. 32; Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 100-01; see also infra Part
II.C.2.
108. See Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 101.
109. Id. at 102; see infra Part II.B.2.
110. 10 U.S.C. § 3037 (2000).
111. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26.
112. Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 105.
113. Id. at 120-21.
114. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 52.
115. Id.
116. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66. This court was formerly known as
the Court of Military Review ("CMR"). National Defense Authorization Act for
1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 924, 108 Stat. 2663, 2831-32 (1995). The name of the
court at the time of the decision being discussed will be the name used in this Note.
117. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67. CAAF was formerly known as the
United States Court of Military Appeals ("CMA"). National Defense Authorization
Act for 1995 § 924. The name of the court at the time of the decision being discussed
will be the name used in this Note.
118. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67a.
119. Id. art. 71.
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appellate structure, the accused can petition TJAG in writing for a
new trial within five years of approval of the sentence by the
convening authority. The defendant usually needs to show newly
discovered evidence or a fraud in the initial court-martial to receive a
new trial. 120
Military jurisdiction to prosecute service members has developed
slowly over history.121 Today, the test is whether the person was on
active-duty status when the crime was committed and when he or she
is being tried." It does not matter if the victim was a civilian or if the
crime was committed outside of a military installation or if the soldier
was off duty. The mere status of being a soldier subjects active-service
members to military justice.' 23
As shown above, courts-martial in the United States originally
involved thirteen panel members. This requirement was later
changed to five. At the same time, the crimes that were punishable by
death were also changing. In 1950, the UCMJ was passed and the
five-member panel was continued along with new jurisdiction over
peacetime murder and rape. Part H will continue with a discussion of
the current state of the law in military and federal systems and how
they protect defendants.
II. ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEMS
This part examines three significant aspects of the trial process in
the military and federal systems: the jury,'24 the defense,'25 and the
appellate procedure.' 26 These three areas comprise a large part of the
trial process, and present the most material for evaluating the ability
of the military justice system to protect defendants. Other elements,
like the rules of evidence, and the prosecutor's burden of proof, are
either identical or very similar to the federal model. a The sections
analyzing the defense and the appellate procedure are meant to
determine whether the military compensates for a five-member panel
by better protecting defendants in these two areas. The analysis of
each section will pay specific attention to the requirements or
120. Id art. 73.
121. See O'Connor, supra note 35, at 201-02.
122. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). This was a reversal of the
Court's previous rulings. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (holding that
the crime must be service related to try an active-duty service member).
123. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 450-51.
124. See infra Part II.B.
125. See infra Part II.C.
126. See infra Part II.D.
127. The military uses the civilian Federal Rules of Evidence as long as they are
not inconsistent with military justice. MCM, supra note 16, Military Rules of
Evidence Rule 101. In convicting, a military court-martial must find that "guilt is
established by legal and competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt." Uniform
Code of Military Justice art. 51(c)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1) (2000).
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procedures of capital trials. The three aspects will be analyzed
through reference to three recent capital military cases, United States
v. Simoy,"8 United States v. Gray,129 and United States v. Curtis,13
along with several non-capital cases. The capital cases were selected
for their recentness and the full development of the appeals process.
Of the three defendants, only Gray remains on death row. 3' The
other two have had their sentences commuted. 132 Besides Gray, the
only other current death row resident who had his appeal heard by an
appellate court is Dwight Loving.133 The other four-Walker, Parker,
Kreutzer, and Quintanilla-have yet to have their appeals filed with
an appellate court.'3
Before examining the relevant aspects of the trial process in
military and federal systems, this part begins with a discussion of the
facts of the capital cases to illustrate the character of capital crimes in
the military. The civilian nature of these crimes is important in Part
III's discussion. 35 The following sections will illustrate some of the
problems in the military and federal systems.
A. The Facts of the Cases
The facts of the cases of Senior Airman Simoy, Specialist Gray, and
Lance Corporal Curtis are disturbing, but similar to crimes committed
in the civilian world. They are a result of motives found in civilian life
like greed, anger, or hatred. It is important to emphasize that these
crimes were not military in nature, and that some did not even occur
on military property. They were in a military court only because the
accused had been active service members at the time of the crime and
trial.
1. Senior Airman Jose F. S. Simoy, U. S. Air Force
Senior Airman Jose Simoy was stationed on Andersen Air Force
Base, Guam, as a law enforcement security policeman.'36 On
December 29, 1991, Simoy, his brother Dennis, Dennis's friend Che
Wolford, and two Filipinos nicknamed Nito and Tickboy robbed a
commissary worker making a night deposit. Wolford pointed a rifle at
Sgt. Stacy LeVay, who was accompanying the commissary worker,
128. 46 M.J. 592 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996).
129. 51 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
130. 52 M.J. 166 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
131. Gray v. United States, 532 U.S. 919 (2001) (denying certiorari); see infra notes
247-49 and accompanying text.
132 See United States v. Simoy, 50 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F 1998); United States v. Curtis,
46 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
134. See supra text accompanying note 9.
135. See infra Part III.
136. United States v. Simoy, 46 M.J. 592, 599 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996).
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and ordered him to freeze. Sgt. LeVay spun around and grabbed the
gun. While they were fighting over it, Dennis hit Sgt. LeVay in the
back of the head with a pipe. Sgt. LeVay fell to the ground where
Dennis beat him to death. Nito and Tickboy attacked the commissary
worker. One punched her in the stomach, knocking her down. The
other grabbed the bag of money. They hopped into the car Simoy was
driving and sped away. When they realized they left Dennis behind,
they went back to get him. I
While waiting for Dennis, the group noticed a man had pulled up
behind them and was checking some papers in his car.138 Wolford
asked Simoy if they had to kiU him. Simoy answered yes. One of the
Filipinos got out with a knife and stabbed Sgt. Donald P. Marquardt
in the chest. He also slashed his neck just missing the trachea. He ran
back to the car and the men sped away. About two weeks later,
Simoy was found and arrested.139 The trial lasted for two weeks, after
which, the eight-member panel convicted Simoy of conspiring to rob
the commissary worker, to murder Sgt. LeVay, to rob Sgt. LeVay of
his pistol and radio, and to attempt the murder of Sgt. Marquardt." °
Simoy was sentenced to death.'
2. Specialist Four, Ronald A. Gray, U. S. Army
In January 1987, the roommate of Kimberly Ann Ruggles became
concerned about her absence. The roommate told the authorities
that Ruggles, a cab driver, had gone to pick up a fare named Ron.' a
Ruggles never returned home. On January 7, 1987, two military
policemen spotted an abandoned cab near the tree line on Fort Bragg.
Several hours later they found Kimberly's body in the woods, not far
from the car.144
She was face down with her hands tied behind her back, nude
except for her socks. She had been raped, sodomized, stabbed, and
suffered bruises and cuts on her face. 4' The evidence, including
fingerprints, implicated Ronald Gray.'" Ten days later, a soldier
discovered the body of Private Laura Lee Vickery-Clay." She had
been severely beaten, shot several times while still alive, raped, and
137. Id. at 600.
13& Id
139. Id. at 600-01.
140. Id at 601.
141. Id.
142. United States v. Gray, 37 MJ. 730, 735 (A.C.M.R. 1992). The court in this
opinion gives only the victims' initials. However, they are identified by name in the
appeal. United States v. Gray, 51 MJ. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
143. Gray, 37 M.J. at 735-36.
144. Id. at 736.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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sodomized. The murder weapon and evidence found on her car also
implicated Gray." Later, a third victim recognized Gray's picture
when it appeared in the newspaper and on television after his arrest.
149
Gray had attacked her in her barracks room. He held a knife to her
throat, tied her hands behind her back with the cord of a curling iron,
raped her, and stabbed her several times in the side and neck. 150
Gray was convicted before a general court-martial of attempted
murder, two specifications of premeditated murder, three
specifications of rape, larceny, two specifications of robbery, two
specifications of forcible sodomy, and burglary. He was sentenced to
death.151
3. Lance Corporal Ronnie A. Curtis, U.S. Marine Corps
Corporal Ronnie Curtis worked as a supply administrative clerk at
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Lieutenant James F. Lotz was his
supervisor.152 During the two years they worked together, Curtis, an
African American, began to believe Lotz was prejudiced towards
him.'53 Lotz's black friends and acquaintances later refuted these
accusations.'-
On April 13, 1987, Curtis went to his barracks after work and drank
a pint of gin.'55 He then took a walk and began to think about his
work situation. He decided to kill Lotz 5 6 Curtis broke into the
supply building and stole a seven-inch knife;157 he then stole a bicycle
and rode the bike to Lotz's house. 58
When he got there he told Lotz that a soldier who worked in the
supply building needed help with his automobile. When Lotz went to
call for help, Curtis stabbed him in the chest.'59 Lotz then called for
his wife before being stabbed a second time in the back."6 Joan Lotz
emerged from the bedroom and went to her dying husband. She then
attacked Curtis, kicking him in the shin with her bare feet.6 Curtis
assaulted Joan, stabbing her in the head, neck, and back as she
148. Id.
149. Id. at 736.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 733.
152. United States v. Curtis, 28 M.J. 1074, 1077 (N-M.C.M.R. 1989).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1078.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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pleaded for him to stop."6 As she lay dying on the floor, Curtis cut off
her panties and touched her vaginal area."'
Curtis then stole some money and fled in one of the Lotz's cars "'
While driving, he fell asleep at the wheel and crashed into a ditch.
When the police questioned him about the accident, he confessed to
the murders.1" Curtis was convicted by a general court-martial of two
premeditated murders, larceny, burglary, unlawful entry, indecent
assault, and damage to government property. 66 He was sentenced to
death.1 67
B. The Jury
This section compares the federal and military jury systems. While
the federal model uses jurors and the military model uses court-
martial members to ascertain guilt, they are identical in purpose. By
analyzing the jury in terms of composition, voting, and empanelment,
this section will illustrate fundamental differences between the two
systems.
1. Composition and Jury Voting
A civilian jury in federal court is governed first by the Constitution,
and second by federal statute.168 Twelve jurors are required in a
federal capital trial. 69 There are six alternate jurors.70 After the jury
has retired to consider the verdict, one juror can be dismissed for just
cause.17 1 There must be a unanimous vote to convict or acquit.'7
Prior to the recent passage of Article 25a,1'73 general courts-martial
consisted of at least five members (the civilian equivalent of jurors)
and a military judge.74 Conviction and sentencing by less than twelve
members in capital cases was common. An eight-member panel
sentenced Jose Simoy 75 A six-member panel sentenced Ronald
Gray. 76 Voting is done by secret ballot." The result of the first
162 Id.
163. 1&
164. Id
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1076.
167. Id. at 1077.
168. See James C. Cissell, Federal Criminal Trials § 12-2 (5th ed. 1999).
169. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b).
170. Id. 24 (c).
171. Cissell, supra note 168, § 12-2(a).
172. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a).
173. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L No. 107-
107, § 582,115 Stat. 1012, 1124 (2001).
174. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2000).
175. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 4 n.5.
176. See id The number of panel members in Curtis's trial could not be
determined from the published cases.
177. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 51.
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ballot is the verdict.78 This vote is preceded by a discussion of the
case amongst the panel members. Like the federal system, the panel
must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 1 In capital cases there
must be separate, unanimous votes on guilt, the presence of an
aggravating factor, the outweighing of mitigating circumstances by
aggravating circumstances, and the sentence of death.18
2. Impaneling the Jury
Selection of a federal jury must be done randomly.' Additionally,
a defendant can object if a distinctive group is excluded from the
jury."8 To prevail the defendant must show the group is not fairly
represented "due to systematic exclusion" in the jury selection
process. 3 The defense can also challenge the composition of the jury
when jurors are selected in an intentionally discriminatory manner'4
To prove this a defendant must show "substantial
underrepresentation of the class to which he belongs.18' 5
The prosecution and the defense can question jurors during voir
dire to help secure a fair and impartial jury.'86 Both sides can use
challenges for cause, which are granted by the judge, and peremptory
challenges, which may be used without explanation or justification.'"
Each side has twenty peremptory challenges in capital cases.'m
Challenges for cause can be granted if a juror fails to meet statutory
requirements, is biased, would suffer undue hardship, or would
threaten the secrecy of the trial.189 In capital cases, jurors cannot be
dismissed based on their conscientious scruples against capital
punishment, so long as they are able to render an impartial verdict. 90
In general courts-martial, the convening authority selects the
potential court-martial members. 9' The convening authority is
usually given a broad presumption of propriety in compiling court-
178. See id. art. 52.
179. Id. art. 51(c)(1).
180. Id. art. 52(b)(1); MCM, supra note 16, Rules for Court-Martial 1004(a)(2),
1004(b)(7), 1004(b)(4)(C), 1006(d)(4)(A).
181. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 12-4.
182. See id. § 12-4(a). A distinctive group is a legal term defined by the courts.
Hispanics are a distinctive group but persons between eighteen and twenty-one years
of age are not. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 12-4(b).
187. Id. § 12-4(d).
188. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b).
189. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 12-4(c).
190. Id.
191. Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 115; see also supra text accompanying
note 109.
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martial members.'ag This presumption can be overcome by showing
the convening authority systematically excluded potential members
from serving 93 or picked members to help the prosecution."" "An
appearance that the convening authority handpicked members to
favor the prosecution may provide sufficient evidence to infer such
intent."195 When picking members to serve, the convening authority
must select possible members who are "best qualified for the duty by
reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and
judicial temperament.' 1 96
Voir dire in the military is different than the federal system because
removed members will not be replaced unless the composition of the
panel goes below quorum (five).191 Like the federal system, the
defense and trial counsel (the military equivalent of the prosecutor)
have for cause and peremptory challenges. 19 The trial counsel,
however, only gets one peremptory challenge regardless of the
number of defendants, while the defense gets one peremptory
challenge for each defendant.1"
3. Comparison
The composition and selection of a panel is substantially different in
the military than in the federal system. The military defense attorney
must choose to either remove panel members who are perceived as
hostile or leave them on the panel, thereby increasing the chances the
verdict will not be unanimous. The federal jury is fixed at twelve so
the defense has no incentive to keep prejudicial jurors. Also, a federal
defense attorney has twenty peremptory challenges-.°° the military
defense attorney has one for each defendant.201 The convening
authority, who also brings the charges against the defendant,
handpicks the panel members.m Jurors in the federal system are
chosen randomly, outside the control of the prosecutionW-3
192- See Matthew J. McCormack, Book Note, Reforming Court-Martial Panel
Selection" Why Change Makes Sense for Military Commanders and Military Justice, 7
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1013,1036 (1999).
193. See id.
194. Id. at 1037.
195. Id-
196. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 25, 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (2000).
197. Id. art. 41.
198. MCM, supra note 16, Rules for Courts-Martial 912.
199. See Robinson 0. Everett, Military Justice in the Armed Forces of the United
States 176 (Greenwood Press 1976) (1956).
200. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 124(d).
201. See Everett, supra note 199, at 176.
202. Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 102.
203. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 12-4.
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4. The Danger of Court-Stacking and Command Influence
Two peculiar problems arise out of the military approach to juries:
court-stacking and command influence.2°4 They are both a result of
the close relationship between the accuser (the convening authority)
and the trier of fact (panel members chosen by the accuser). The
problem can go undetected for a long time. Several non-capital cases
have been thrown out by the military appellate courts for court-
stacking or unlawful command influence.
In United States v. Youngblood, the CAAF set aside the sentence
because biased members were not removed for cause during voir
dire.2 °5 Ten days before the trial, several panel members attended a
staff meeting where the convening authority and the Staff Judge
Advocate ("SJA") discussed the state of discipline in the unit.206 The
convening authority also expressed his opinion of appropriate levels
of punishment.207 The SJA told a story about a soldier who, according
to the SJA, did not decide the sentence in a child abuse case properly.
The convening authority said he had handled the matter by telling the
soldier's next commanding officer that the soldier's career was at its
peak and he should not be promoted any more.20 8
In another case, United States v. Reynolds, the convening authority
expressed to four soldiers his dissatisfaction with previous courts-
martial results.209 He also expressed his opinion that anyone involved
with drugs did not belong in the military.21 0 Reynolds was charged
with a drug offense, pled guilty, and was sentenced by a special court-
martial that included those four soldiers.2 1
United States v. Hilow is a good example of court stacking.212 In that
case nominees were selected because they were "'commanders and
supporters of a command policy of hard discipline.' ' 213 Hilow also
presents a different problem-someone other than the convening
authority compiled the list of nominees, thus demonstrating the broad
204. See Guy P. Glazier, He Called for His Pipe, and He Called for His Bowl, and
He Called for His Members Three-Selection of Military Juries by the Sovereign:
Impediment to Military Justice, 157 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 45-54 (1998). Court-stacking is
done by impaneling members whom the convening authority thinks will vote a certain
way. Id. at 45. Command influence occurs when the convening authority tries
implicitly or explicitly to persuade panel members to vote a certain way.
205. United States v. Youngblood, 47 M.J. 338, 341-42 (C.A.A.F. 1997); see
Glazier, supra note 204, at 61-62.
206. Youngblood, 47 M.J. at 339.
207. Id. at 340.
208. Id.; Glazier, supra note 204, at 62.
209. United States v. Reynolds, 40 M.J. 198, 199-200 (C.M.A. 1994); Glazier, supra
note 204, at 65.
210. Reynolds, 40 M.J. at 200; see Glazier, supra note 204, at 65.
211. Reynolds, 40 M.J. at 198-99; see Glazier, supra note 204, at 65.
212. United States v. Hilow, 32 M.J. 439 (C.M.A. 1991).
213. Id. at 441.
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range of individuals capable of stacking a panel.24 There was no
evidence the convening authority meant to engage in court stacking,
but the chosen potential members were already tainted."'S In another
case, United States v. McClain, the SJA only recommended senior
officers and non-commissioned officers to the convening authorities.21 6
He wanted to avoid the lighter sentences he thought junior officers
and enlisted men gave. 7 These abuses do not arise in the federal
system, where the jury is chosen through an anonymous and random
process.
C. The Defense
This section analyzes the way accused are defended in the different
systems. The defense of the accused is one of the most important
aspects of a trial. Only through an effective, rigorous defense can a
reliable verdict be achieved. The defense is examined through the
quality of defense counsel and the right to a grand jury or Article 32
hearing.
1. Quality of Counsel
There are rules for assignment of counsel in federal cases.218 Each
United States district court must institute a plan for furnishing
representation for defendants who cannot afford it.219 The plan must
include the appointment of private attorneys or attorneys from a bar
association, a legal aid society, a federal public defender organization,
or a community defender group.20 The right to representation covers
the entire process from initial appearance through appeal, including
all ancillary matters?2 In capital cases a judge must promptly, on
defendant's request, "[a]ssign [two] such counsel, of whom at least
[one] shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases.'
Defense counsel in the military is provided to the accused in all
general courts-martial, while associate counsel is optional! 3 Defense
attorneys must also be a member of the federal bar or bar of the
highest court of the state and be certified as competent to perform
their duties by TJAG for the appropriate branch of the armed
214. Id.
215. See Glazier, supra note 204, at 45-46.
216. United States v. McClain, 22 MJ. 124 (C.M.A. 1986).
217. Id. at 130; Glazier, supra note 204, at 51.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000).
219. Id. § 3006A(a)
220. See id. § 3006A(b).
221. Id. § 3006A(c).
222. Id. § 3005.
223. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (2000).
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services.' At either the trial or appellate stage, the defendant may
hire his own civilian counsel.m
Military defense counsel may be more experienced in trial advocacy
than the prosecutors. 6 For example, in the Air Force, "JAGs who
acquire sufficient litigation experience, expertise, and skill as
prosecutors may request to be a defense counsel." 7 Nevertheless,
death penalty cases in the military "always include claims that the
defense lawyer was incompetent."' These claims have had varying
degrees of success. 229 The military does not require defense counsel to
be ABA "death-qualified." 0
2. The Grand Jury; Article 32
The Fifth Amendment guarantees a civilian accused of a capital
crime the right of a grand jury hearing. 1 To indict, there must be a
finding of probable cause. 2  The government attorney has no
obligation to present evidence that may be exculpatory or undermine
their own witnesses. 3  The government attorneys, the witnesses, an
interpreter when needed, and a stenographer may be present during
the grand jury proceedings.23 The presence of unauthorized persons
may void a grand jury's indictment.235
The military system uses a pretrial investigation, referred to as an
Article 32 hearinge 6 instead of a grand jury. This is constitutional
because the Fifth Amendment explicitly does not apply to the
military. 7 During an Article 32 hearing, the accused is present and
has the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine government
224. Id.
225. Id. arts. 38(b)(2), 70(d).
226. See Telephone Interview with Col. Adele H. Odegard, Chief, Defense
Appellate Division (Nov. 19, 2001) (stating defense attorneys are usually not right out
of school) (notes on file with the Fordham Law Review).
227. The Judge Advocate General's Office, U.S. Air Force, United States Air
Force JAG: Immediate Challenge, Unlimited Opportunity 7 (2001).
228. United States v. Simoy, 46 M.J. 592, 623 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996).
229. Compare United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1, 18 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (holding that
counsel was not ineffective), and United States v. Simoy, 46 M.J. 592, 607 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 1996) (same), with United States v. Murphy, 50 M.J. 4, 9 (C.A.A.F. 1998)
(finding counsel ineffective), and United States v. Curtis, 46 M.J. 129, 130 (C.A.A.F.
1997) (same).
230. United States v. Curtis, 44 MJ. 106, 126 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("This Court has
rejected a requirement for appointment of ABA qualified counsel....").
231. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
232. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 4-1.
233. See id. § 4-4.
234. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)(1).
235. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 4-2(g).
236. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2000).
237. See U.S. Const. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment also does not apply to the
military, but for less clear reasons. See generally Eugene M. Van Loan III, The Jury,
The Court-Martial, and the Constitution, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 363 (1972).
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witnesses, and the right to present anything that goes towards a
defense or mitigation.' This is vastly different than the federal grand
jury where the defendant may not even be present. Military defense
attorneys may either use the Article 32 hearing to put on a full-
fledged defense to prevent charges from being forwarded to trial or
simply appraise the prosecution's case.?39 After the hearing, the
investigating officer makes a recommendation about what should be
done next so as to further justice and discipline!' Either way, a non-
verbatim transcript of the Article 32 hearing cannot be used in the
court-martial proceedings.241
3. Comparison
While the military defense attorney may have more trial
experience, this does not, by definition, translate into more capital
trial experience. The burden of trying a capital case is very different
than the burden of trying a non-capital one.2 42 One obvious difference
is the possible death of the defendant. There are other considerations
as well. The cases of defendants facing the death penalty tend to be
horrific and violent 43 A military capital case is also the only military
trial to require a unanimous verdict!' The federal system requires
that one of the defendant's lawyers have knowledge of the capital
law-arguably not a high standard. The military does not?-
Facially, an Article 32 investigation gives the accused a chance to
disprove the charge before the case even goes to trial, but there is no
concrete standard of proof required of the prosecution; it is simply to
further justice and discipline.2' A grand jury, on the other hand,
hears only the prosecutor's argument. This can make it easier to
indict in the federal system.
4. The Problem of Ineffective Counsel
This section illustrates some of the problems with the military and
federal systems. These problems may be great enough to prevent the
military from providing a more reliable system of defense than a
flawed, but capable federal system.
238. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32(b).
239. Telephone Interview with Col. Adele H. Odegard, Chief, supra note 226.
240. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32.
241. United States v. Douglas, 1 M.J. 354,356 (C.M.A. 1976).
242. For instance, in a capital trial, the more panel members, the better the chance
at avoiding the death penalty. In a non-capital general courts-martial, where the
verdict is not unanimous, a larger panel is not necessarily an advantage. See infra text
accompanying note 356.
243. See supra Part II.A.
244. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 52.
245. United States v. Curtis, 44 M.J. 106, 126 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
246. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32(a).
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The CAAF found such egregious ineffectiveness of counsel in
United States v. Curtis that it set aside the sentence.247 The CAAF also
found ineffective counsel in both the trial phase and sentencing in one
case, United States v. Murphy.248 Jose Simoy's case presents an
example of trial experience not necessarily preparing a defense
attorney for a capital trial. In an affidavit, Simoy's attorney, Major
Doyle, supported Simoy's claim of ineffective counsel, stating, "our
efforts were sufficient for a non-capital felony court-martial, [but] we
failed to perform up to the professional standards I have since realized
are necessary in the representation of a capital case." '249
The attorneys in Simoy's case had varying degrees of trial
experience but neither was well-versed in capital litigation. Captain
Bemis was the installation defense counsel and had tried some courts-
martial, although the record does not indicate the nature of these
courts-martial." Captain Bemis also worked as a civilian attorney for
about one year handling some misdemeanor criminal cases. 1 Major
Doyle was assigned to Air Force members who had committed more
serious crimes. 2  Before the Simoy case, he had defended or
prosecuted between thirty and forty trials and worked as an appellate
defense attorney on about 200 cases5 3 By Doyle's own admission,
however, this experience did not adequately prepare him for a capital
trial. Two former high-ranking officers in the Army JAGC, Michael I.
247. United States v. Curtis, 46 MJ. 129, 130 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (finding ineffective
counsel for failure to present mitigating factors in the sentencing phase). The court
then ordered the case remanded to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals for imposition of a life sentence or a rehearing on sentencing. Id.
248. 50 M.J. 4 (C.A.A.F. 1998). The court held that post-trial evidence cast doubt
on the defendant's ability to form premeditation and whether the defendant had a fair
sentencing hearing. The case was returned to the Army Court of Criminal Appeals,
which could do several things:
(1) Review the new evidence to determine if a different verdict as to findings
might reasonably result in light of posttrial evidence; (2) If it determined
that the record before it is inadequate to resolve the factual issues regarding
findings, it may order a DuBay hearing to consider the factual issues raised
on appeal as to the findings; (3) If it determines that a different verdict
would not reasonably result as to findings, then it may either affirm
appellant's sentence only as to life imprisonment and accessory penalties, or
it may order a rehearing as to the death sentence; (4) If it determines that a
different verdict on findings might reasonably result, then it shall order a
rehearing on findings and sentence; (5) If on remand the Court of Criminal
Appeals determines that further review under Article 66 is impracticable,
then in the interest of judicial economy, it may order forthwith a rehearing
on findings and sentence.
Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
249. United States v. Simoy 46 M.J. 592, 603 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996) (emphasis
omitted). Simoy's death sentence was eventually set aside for faulty jury instructions.
United States v. Simoy, 50 M.J. 1, 3 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
250. Simoy, 46 M.J. at 602.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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Spak and Jonathon P. Tomes, have also commented on the
inexperience of military defense counsel. They wrote, "we agree that
[military defense counsel] are generally too inexperienced today to
entrust with representing service members before general courts-
marital in death penalty or life imprisonment cases."' '
Simoy's case also demonstrates the arguably illusory advantage an
Article 32 hearing has over a grand jury. 5 During Simoy's Article 32
hearing, two government witnesses were more than a hundred miles
away, so the investigating officer, rather than compelling them to
appear, considered their prior sworn statements?- 6 The Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals ("AFCCA") held that the one hundred
mile standard for not requiring a witness to appear as stated in Rules
for Court Martial 405(g)(1)(A) was not a bright-line rule.P It was
supposed to be weighed against the importance of the witness. s This
weighing was not done in Simoy's case. However, the court found it
harmless error because the defense did not move to depose the
witnesses and thereby preserve the right to appeal that issue.-5 9 The
AFCCA did not put much bite into a defendant's right to examine
witnesses for the prosecution during an Article 32 hearing. The
CAAF upheld the court's decision.20
Of course, ineffective counsel in capital cases plagues the civilian
system as well. While this section focuses on the federal criminal
system, the use of federal habeas corpus proceedings have caused
federal courts to rule on claims of ineffective counsel from state
capital trials. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent to a denial of certiorari
in McFarland v. Scott,261 strongly criticized the public-defender system
for its lack of resources and lack of standards for counsel in death-
penalty cases. 2 Justice Blackmun also criticized the relatively high
threshold for finding ineffective counsel.26  "Ten years after the
articulation of that standard, practical experience establishes that
the... test, in application, has failed to protect a defendant's right to
be represented by something more than 'a person who happens to be
254. Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Tinte to Play Taps?, 28
Sw. U. L. Rev. 481,525 (1999).
255. See Simoy, 46 MJ. at 608.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. United States v. Simoy, 50 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
261. 512 U.S. 1256 (1994).
262. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that public defenders in Louisiana were limited in
capital cases to $1000 to pay for pretrial preparation and the trial, Kentucky's
maximum was $2500 and Alabama offered $1000 for each part. Id. at 1258.
263. Id. at 1259; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (articulating
a high threshold for finding counsel so ineffective that the Sixth Amendment was
violated).
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a lawyer.""'2  Justice Blackmun gave a laundry list of outrageous
defense counsel behavior in several capital trials:
Capital defendants have been sentenced to death when represented
by counsel who never bothered to read the state death penalty
statute, [who] slept through or otherwise were not present during
trial, or failed to investigate or present any mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase ... who had been admitted to the bar only six
months before and never had conducted a criminal trial.... [Who
conducted] a [one]-day trial and [twenty]-minute penalty phase
proceeding, in which.., counsel stipulated to the defendant's age at
the time of the crime and rested.... [And] who failed to challenge
his client's racially unrepresentative jury [and] could name only two
cases: Miranda v. Arizona and Dred Scott v. Sandford.265
Justice Blackmun also cited to one particularly egregious case where
the defense attorney presented no defense, did not object during the
trial, stressed the horror of the crime during closing arguments, and,
argued during sentencing that death was appropriate.2 6
D. Appellate Procedure
This section focuses on the appellate process, in particular, its
purpose and scope of review. This is the last safeguard for a convicted
person's rights. In the three capital cases discussed below, two
defendants had their death sentences commuted to life imprisonment
and one had his death sentence upheld. This section will illustrate
that the two systems, military and federal, reach similar results
through different processes.
1. The Appellate Process
The Constitution and federal law govern appeals from a final
judgment in federal court.267 The circuit courts have appellate
jurisdiction over such final judgments.261 These appeals are a right
guaranteed to the defendant. The Supreme Court has discretionary
jurisdiction. It can decide to review a capital case but is not compelled
to do so. 269
In the military, after completion of the trial, the commander who
convened the court-martial must affirm the court's actions. 270 The
commander cannot change a finding of not guilty, but is authorized to
disagree with a finding of guilty, and can reduce, mitigate, or
264. McFarland, 512 U.S. at 1259 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685).
265. Id. (citations omitted).
266. Id. at 1260 (citing Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1985).
267. See Tigar, supra note 23, § 2.02; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
268. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
269. See Tigar, supra note 23, § 2.01.
270. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 60, 10 U.S.C. § 860 (2000).
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disapprove any sentence or part of a sentence." The SJA, the
prosecutor's commanding officer, must also write a review!" After a
capital trial, the entire record, including the outcome of the case and
the SJA's opinion must be sent to TJAG of the defendant's military
branch.2  TJAG conducts an administrative review to determine if
the law supports the findings and sentence.274 All cases involving
sentences of death must be referred to the Court of Criminal Appeals
for the defendant's service branch.2 7 The court must consist of a
minimum of three judges who are commissioned officers or civilians,
members of the federal bar or the bar of the highest state court, and
appointed by their service branch's TJAG. 6 The judges are usually
senior JAG officers.' 7
If a Court of Criminal Appeals affirms the sentence of death, the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces hears the case.' The court is
comprised of five civilian judges, appointed by the President and
approved by the Senate for staggered fifteen-year terms.219 The
Supreme Court can review the case by writ of certiorari8
2. Purposes and Scope of Review
Appellate review in the federal and military systems is designed to
serve as a safeguard, not a second trial."8 Consequently, in the federal
system facts are rarely re-examined except to determine if they
support the verdict.' A federal appellate court will review questions
of fact under a "clearly erroneous" standard.28 Issues of law are
examined under a more relaxed "merely wrong" standard.21
In federal death-penalty cases, an appellate court reviews the entire
record to determine if the "sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and
whether the evidence supports the special finding of the existence of
an aggravating factor."' If the court finds the sentence was imposed
271. Id. art. 60(e)(2). The convening authority cannot reconsider a finding of not
guilty or increase the severity of the sentence unless that sentence is mandatory. Id.
272. Id. arts. 61,65.
273. Id. art. 65.
274. Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 128.
275. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66(b).
276. Id art. 66(a).
277. Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 128-29.
278. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67(a)(1).
279. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L
No. 101-189, § 1301, 103 Stat. 1352, 1569-78 (1990).
280. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67a.
281. See Alan D. Hornstein, Appellate Advocacy in a Nutshell 31 (1984); see also
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66(c).
282. Hornstein, supra note 281, at 31.
283. Id. at 33.
284. Id. at 34-35.
285. 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1) (2000).
2002] 2091
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
under the influence of a prohibited factor, the finding of an
aggravating factor was not supported by the admissible evidence, or
there was any other properly preserved error that affected sentencing,
the court can remand for a new hearing to determine whether a
sentence of death was justified or for imposition of a penalty other
than death. 6
The military appellate courts conduct a similar type of review;287
however, the Courts of Criminal Appeals have broader powers of
review and can consider questions of fact, credibility of witnesses, the
weight of evidence, and all questions of law.218 The CAAF considers
only issues of law,289 but can set aside the findings and the sentence,
order a new hearing, or set aside the sentence.2 °
3. Comparison
The military system has more levels of review than the federal
system. Before an appellate court hears a case, the convening
authority, the SJA and TJAG all examine the trial record and the
sentence. The Courts of Criminal Appeals also have greater power
than their federal counterparts because they can determine questions
of fact, reliability of witnesses, and evidence. However, the judges on
this court are appointed by their respective service branch's TJAG;291
the President appoints federal appellate court judges. The scope and
purpose each appellate system undertakes in capital cases is nearly
identical.
4. The Strength of the Appellate Process
This section illustrates some of the problems that can occur in the
military and federal appellate systems. Ronald Curtis's case is a good
example of a Court of Criminal Appeals not affording the best
protection to the defendant. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals ("N-MCCA") and the CAAF affirmed Curtis's
death sentence twicez 2 before the sentence was thrown-out by the
CAAF on reconsideration.293 The first time the N-MCCA affirmed,
the CAAF, on appeal, remanded the case back for a review of several
other issues.294 After the second affirmation by the N-MCCA, the
286. Id. § (c)(2).
287. See United States v. Simoy 50 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
288. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66(c).
289. Id. art. 67(c).
290. Id. art. 67(d).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
292. United States v. Curtis, 38 M.J. 530 (N-M.C.M.R. 1993); United States v.
Curtis, 28 M.J. 1074 (N-M.C.M.R. 1989).
293. United States v. Curtis, 46 M.J. 129, 130 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
294. See Curtis, 38 M.J. at 532.
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CAAF affirmed the N-MCCA's decision on the death sentence."
The N-MCCA did not find defense counsel rose to a level of
ineffectiveness that the CAAF did when it ultimately reversed the
lower court.296 This illustrates that in practice the added level of
appellate review in the military may be illusory.
The United States courts of appeal have been criticized on two
fronts: their inability to handle an increasing caseload and their
"excessively ideological" decisions.29 The increased caseload has led
to reduced time for oral arguments and deciding cases in
nonprecedential order.2 98 Some critics have called the appellate courts
"appellate factories."2' Making decisions based on ideological
reasons instead of on the merits may benefit some defendants
sentenced to death, but it also may cause a backlash with more
conservative justices. This happened with Supreme Court justices
after the Court's decision to reinstate the death penalty in 19 7 631
Justices Marshall and Brennan, ideologically opposed to the death
penalty, began to "votefl to reverse or vacate every death sentence
that came before the Court."'" The conservative backlash reduced
the grounds for which defendants could seek federal habeas relief, a
major avenue of appeal for people sentenced to death.'
This part compared the way the military and the federal system
protect defendants facing the death penalty. Both systems use the
appellate procedure to safeguard defendant's rights. Both systems,
however, suffer from problems-particularly ineffective counsel.
However, the military model places defendants at a distinct
disadvantage because of how a panel is selected. Part HI attempts to
show that this shortcoming makes it necessary that military
defendants in capital trials for non-military crimes be judged by
twelve-member panels.
III. SHOULD MILITARY CAPITAL CASES HAVE A GUARANTEE OF
TWELVE-MEMBER PANELS?
This part analyzes the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 and argues that the change in panel size for capital
cases did not go far enough. The first section argues that two primary
barriers, the outdated rationale for changing the panel size in 1786
and the denial of civilian protections to soldiers, no longer apply
295. United States v. Curtis, 44 MJ. 106,116 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
296. See Curtis, 46 MJ. at 130.
297. Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 Colum. L Rev. 1600, 1604
(2000).
29& See id
299. See id.
300. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
301. Lazarus, supra note 23, at 148.
302. See id at 149.
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today. Once these barriers are overcome, the military's failure to
adequately protect the rights of the accused proves the necessity of
twelve-member panels in capital trials for non-military crimes. If
twelve-member panels are necessary, it becomes important to show
why the new legislation is not adequate. The next section will
illustrate how similarly written, previous legislation establishing
thirteen-member panels was easily sidestepped. The Note concludes
with a suggested UCMJ amendment that would guarantee no soldier
is executed for murder and/or rape without first being convicted by
twelve people.
A. Necessity of Twelve-Member Panels
This section begins with the contention that two barriers to
increasing military panels have become obsolete. The first barrier is
that the 1786 context in which five-member panels were adequate is
no longer applicable today. Developments in the military have
rendered the rationale for five-member panels a historical anomaly.
The second barrier is the idea that incorporating civilian liberties into
the military will hurt good order and discipline. The example of
civilian protections being incorporated without great protest or
condemnation in United States v. Matthews3 3 and United States v.
Tempia 4 refutes this notion. This section concludes with the
argument that the military does not adequately protect an accused's
rights in capital trials. This inadequacy demands that twelve people
judge defendants in capital trials for civilian crimes.
The arguments made in this section could be extended to all capital
crimes in the military. This is the approach taken by Article 25a. °5
This Note, however, deals with only civilian crimes, specifically
murder and rape. This is an important distinction because of the
demands of military justice. All reforms to the UCMJ must not hurt
good order and discipline in the armed forces. 3°6 A strictly military
crime, like spying or aiding the enemy, can hurt an entire unit and
even weaken the country.3°7  The interests of good order and
discipline are strong enough to outweigh the need for a twelve-
member panel. The difference between a crime that injures a few,
like murder, and a crime that can injure many, like spying, requires
that the two be treated separately. Additionally, a central contention
303. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
304. 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967).
305. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-107, § 582, 115 Stat. 1012, 1124 (2001).
306. MCM, supra note 16, pmbl.
307. Some other military capital crimes include: assaulting or willfully disobeying
superior commissioned officer, mutiny or sedition, misbehavior before the enemy,
subordinate compelling surrender, improper use of a countersign, and forcing a
safeguard. Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 90, 94, 99-102, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890,
894, 899-902 (2000).
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of this Note is that service-members should not receive less protection
than their civilian counterparts solely because of their occupation.
With the possible exception of spying, none of the other military
capital crimes have an equivalent civilian crime. Therefore, service
members do not receive less protection merely because of their
occupation; they receive less protection because of their crime.
1. The Historical Precedent
The Articles of War of 1775 required, without exception, that court-
martial panels consist of thirteen officers.-' The amendment in 1786
created an exception to this requirement to allow smaller panels if
thirteen-member panels would harm military service. -'
Knox's request in 1785, which led to the amendment,310 resulted
from a concern with a shrinking army and its ability to convene
thirteen officers without lowering the effectiveness of the military."1'
While today's military has also downsized, the numbers are vastly
different than in Knox's day. One historian has estimated the entire
United States Army had fewer than forty officers in 1786.1 Three
years later the Army had only 672 soldiers.313  Impaneling thirteen
officers would have constituted almost a third of the officer corps.
The small size of the Army was a result of several factors; the
primary two will be discussed here. First, the United States had great
trouble in repaying its debts, including the salaries of the soldiers,
after the war. 14 Things got so bad, that in June 1783, a group of
soldiers from Pennsylvania took their muskets and bayonets and
surrounded the State House in Philadelphia where Congress was
meeting.15 Second, there was already a fear of standing armies rooted
in the colonial experience;316 the Philadelphia incident may have
placed this concern in the forefront of public consciousness and given
Knox little hope of an expanded military capable of meeting the
minimum number of panel members. Today, the armed forces
308. American Articles of War of 1775, art XXXIII, reprinted in Winthrop, supra
note 40, app. at 956.
309. American Articles of War of 1786, art 1, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40,
app. at 972.
310. 29 Journals of the Continental Congress, supra note 42, at 851; see supra text
accompanying note 42.
311. The impetus for Knox's request probably came from two courts-martial in
Western Pennsylvania where the defendants' convictions for desertion had to be
overturned because there were only five members on each panel. Sullivan, supra note
36, at 6 n.18.
312. Id. at 5 n.17.
313. Id at 5 n.16.
314. See Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American
Republic 1776-1790, at 58 (1965).
315. Id. at 69.
316. See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 150 (1996) (discussing Anti-Federalist
fears of a standing army during the debates of 1787-88).
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certainly have the resources to afford any service member on trial for
his or her life the right to a jury of twelve.317
There is another, more compelling, reason to disregard Knox's
concerns-the difference in crimes for which a soldier can be
sentenced to death. In 1786, all of the military crimes eligible for the
death penalty were uniquely military in nature.318 The military never
prosecuted murder and rape in peacetime before 1950.319 The UCMJ
brought panel size and the death penalty together in a disastrous way
for soldiers' civil rights. It removed the requirement that a panel have
thirteen members whenever possible 320 and added jurisdiction over
murder and rape committed in peacetime.32" ' Soldiers were prosecuted
for civilian crimes-murder and rape-in a military court with no
guarantee of twelve-member panels. Civilians were tried under
federal or state law and guaranteed twelve jurors.32
This unfortunate result might have been a by-product of the
piecemeal manner in which the UCMJ was compiled and ratified.
The authors looked at each article from the Army Articles of War and
the Rules for Governing the Navy individually.323 There is no
indication that they were ever examined for their overall effect when
combined.324 Congress likewise reviewed the articles in a piecemeal
manner.3 5 It appears this critical question of panel size was never
debated or even considered.
The added burden of prosecuting soldiers who commit a murder in
peacetime, previously a uniquely civilian crime, was a momentous
change in 1950. Knox's reasons for five-member panels certainly do
not apply to prosecutions for peacetime murder and rape. Even
without the change in 1950, the reasons for resizing were particular to
the country and the military in 1786. The congressional passage of the
UCMJ in 1950 does not support the current system because there is
no record of congressional intent. The creation of a system where
317. In November 2001, there were over 200,000 officers in the armed forces and
over 1.3 million enlisted men. Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel
by Rank/Grade (Nov. 2001), at http://webl.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/msl 1.pdf.
318. See O'Connor, supra note 35, at 188-89.
319. See id. at 192; see also Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 118, 10 U.S.C. §
918 (2000).
320. American Articles of War of 1786, art 1, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40,
app. at 972.
321. See O'Connor, supra note 35, at 189, 192; see also Uniform Code of Military
Justice art. 118.
322. See supra text accompanying note 169.
323. Generous, supra note 62, at 37.
324. See id.
325. See A Bill to Unify, Consolidate, Revise, and Codify the Articles of War, the
Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast
Guard, and to Enact and Establish a Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearing on
H.R. 2498 Before the House Subcomm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong. 955-56 (1949).
Discussion of the punitive articles, if any, would have occurred after the public
hearings. Id. at 1307.
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fewer than twelve people can sentence soldiers to death for non-
military crimes was never discussed in subcommittee hearings before
the Senate and the House of Representatives. 6
2. Incorporating Civilian Protections into the Military
The rules of military justice must uphold the standards of good
order and discipline.32 7 Any incorporation of civilian protections to
the military system must meet this standard. Several decisions since
1950 vastly altered how the military prosecuted the accused and
imposed the death penalty. These incorporations have not caused a
great uproar over the decline of good order and discipline.' There is
good reason to believe a no-exceptions requirement of twelve-panel
members in trials for capital, non-military crimes would also not affect
good order and discipline.
There is, admittedly, a long tradition of keeping the military and
civilian systems separate. General William T. Sherman said:
The object of the civil law is to secure to every human being in a
community all the liberty, security, and happiness possible,
consistent with the safety of all. The object of military law is to
govern armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable of
exercising the largest measure of force at the will of the nation. 2
Justice Rehnquist echoed this sentiment about one hundred years
later:
This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also
recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws
and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences
between the military and civilian communities result from the fact
that "it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise."3'
These statements acknowledge that giving civilian protections to
soldiers must not hinder the effectiveness of the military. They do not
mean civilian protections cannot be given to military members. In
fact, the mission statement of the UCMJ is to make a new, modem
code "with a view to protecting the rights of those subject to the code
326. See id.; Bills to Unify, Consolidat Revise, and Codify the Articles of War, the
Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast
Guard, and to Enact and Establish a Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearing on S.
857 and H.R. 4080 Before the Senate Subconmm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong. (1949).
327. MCM, supra note 16, pmbl.
328. A thorough search revealed no negative reaction by military authorities to
these decisions.
329. Van Loan, supra note 237, at 417 (citation omitted).
330. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (citation omitted).
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and increasing public confidence in military justice, without impairing
the performance of military functions. 3 31
Two decisions to incorporate civilian protections into the military,
United States v. Matthews 332 and United States v. Tempia,333
fundamentally altered the way military justice was administered to
soldiers. However, the incorporation of these civilian protections did
not create widespread condemnation among military lawyers or
commentators and neither case has been overruled.3  If these
protections were brought into the military system without problems,
than there is similar hope for twelve-member panels. While Matthews
and Tempia were based on already existing military rights,335 there is
no reason to suppose that a no-exceptions requirement of twelve-
panel members in capital trials for murder and rape would be difficult
to institute or create a breakdown in good order and discipline. The
military has already been able to prosecute two defendants with
twelve-member panels, as it did with two current death-row inmates,
Kreutzer and Quintanilla.336 A no-exceptions rule requiring twelve-
member panels would affect only those service-members accused of
murder and/or rape and facing the death penalty, a miniscule portion
of all service members. Additionally, if the panel was not unanimous
on the imposition of the death penalty, it could still convict with a
two-thirds vote. The sentence would be life imprisonment-the
statutory minimum. 37 Such a rule would not require the prosecution
to try murders as non-capital when the burden of twelve-panel
members could not be met; in those situations, the soldier could be
turned over to the civilian authorities for trial or moved to an
installation that could impanel twelve soldiers.
3. Current Practice
The current military practice in capital cases does not meet the
heightened standards that should accompany a decision to prosecute
and execute soldiers who commit a civilian, capital crime.338  The
military justice system is designed to further different goals than the
civilian system. Good order and discipline are the principles to which
331. Generous, supra note 62, at 34.
332. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983); see discussion supra Part I.B.1.
333. 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967); see discussion supra Part I.B.2.
334. See supra Part I.B.
335. The Matthews court based its decision partly on the fact the military already
had an article banning cruel and unusual punishment, and Furman was decided on
Eighth Amendment grounds. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 368-69; see also U.S. Const. amend
VIII. The Tempia court based its decision partly on the existence of an article similar
to the Miranda warnings. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. at 260.
336. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 4 n.5.
337. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 118 (2000).
338. The death penalty requires a higher standard of reliability. See Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976); supra Part II.B-D.
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military justice must measure up?3 9 While good order and discipline
justify less than twelve-member panels in military crimes like
desertion or aiding the enemy,- ° it fails to justify the systematic
abuses that can occur during a military trial which can result in the
death of a soldier for a civilian crime. The military particularly fails
when it comes to the method by which a panel is chosen3' and the
accused is defended. 2 The appellate procedure provides a protection
equal to the federal model, 31 but it is not enough to make up for the
other deficiencies.
It might be argued that since no soldier has been put to death since
1961, 4 the system is working. Rather than providing an example of
judicial prudence, this is probably a result of a judicially active CMA
incorporating civilian protections in the 1960s and '70s - S and the 1983
United States v. Matthews-6 decision, holding the military death
penalty unconstitutional. Ronald Reagan, as commander-in-chief,
remedied that problem by providing aggravating factors that must be
present in order to sentence a person to death. Two of the first cases
tried under that new rubric are now approaching the final stages of
their appeals.' 47 The pause in executions may be at an end if President
George W. Bush maintains the execution track record he established
as governor of Texas.'
Panel selection, the biggest problem in military justice, can be
divided into two sub-problems: command influence and stacking the
panel349 Command influence has proven to be a problem in the
military justice system.5 0 The existence of a secret ballot does not
solve the command influence problem because pre-vote deliberations
can reveal dissenting panel members. It is also not mandated that the
ballot remain secret after it is taken. 51 Dissenting members could
later be forced to reveal their decision. Court stacking stems from the
requirement that a convening authority appoint soldiers wvith a good
judicial temperament.352 It seems difficult, if not impossible, to
determine persons' judicial temperament by examining their service
339. MCM, supra note 16, pmbl.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 306-07.
341. See supra Part II.B.
342- See supra Part II.C.
343. See supra Part II.D.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
345. See infra note 381.
346. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
347. See supra text accompanying note 9.
348. Bush presided over nearly 150 executions as governor of Texas, including
forty in 2000 alone, more than any state in history. The Associated Press, Rally
Denounces Executions, N.Y. Newsday, Dec. 19,2000, at A19.
349. See supra Part II.B.4.
350. See Glazier, supra note 204, at 45-54.
351. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 51, 10 U.S.C. § 851 (2000).
352. See supra text accompanying note 111.
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record. Probably the best way to know persons' judicial temperament
is to know them or know of them.353  This means a convening
authority could appoint people who lean towards the same ideological
viewpoint. If the convening authority wanted a death sentence it
would not be difficult to appoint members who are known to be
proponents of the death penalty or at least strong believers in good
order and discipline.3 -
The federal system does not suffer from these problems. Since the
pool is random, there is little chance the jury would want to convict to
win the approval of the prosecutor. Randomness is so prized that an
attempt to create a less random but fairer religious and racial
grouping of jurors has been cause to vacate the trial and order a new
one.35 5 The prosecutor has no ability to affect the lives or careers of
the jurors before, during, or after the trial.
The biggest advantage in a twelve-member panel is the increase in
the number of votes needed to sentence a person to death. Since the
vote must be unanimous and is only taken once, an accused with
twelve panel members has a larger pool from which to find a sparing
vote than does a defendant with only five panel members. Judge
Morgan wrote in his concurrence in United States v. Simoy:
The larger the jury pool, the more likely it is to harbor the one or
two dissenting votes. Remarkably, a minority viewpoint held by 10
percent of the population (such as a strong moral aversion to the
death penalty, perhaps?) has only a 28.2 percent chance of going
unrepresented in a 12-member jury, but more than half of 6-member
juries could be expected to have no representative of that view at
all.356
This chance for excluding viewpoints grows if a convening authority
can impanel members known not to represent a minority view.
The way a defense is conducted in the military also does not afford
enough protection to compensate for a panel of only five members.
There are two relevant issues: the quality of the defense317 and the
amount of protection actually afforded by an Article 32 hearing.358
The quality of the defense attorney is a common criticism of both
military and civilian capital trials. There are no specific qualifications
353. Telephone Interview with Col. Adele H. Odegard, supra note 226.
354. See Glazier, supra note 204, at 45-54; supra Part II.B.4.
355. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164,201-05 (2d Cir. 2002).
356. United States v. Simoy, 46 M.J 592, 627 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996). Other
studies have found that the verdicts of smaller juries in criminal trials will vary to the
detriment of the defendant. Ronald Jay Allen et al., Comprehensive Criminal
Procedure 1188 (2001). Other studies have shown that a large jury is more likely to
hang than a small one. Id. In the military this would mean the defendant could not be
sentenced to death because the vote would not be unanimous. Uniform Code of
Military Justice art. 52. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (2000).
357. See supra Part II.C.4.
358. See supra Part II.C.4.
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for appointment of defense counsel in military capital cases. The
same guidelines apply for capital and non-capital trials.359 The federal
system at least requires that one defense counsel be learned in capital
litigation.3" In the military, the CAAF has expressly rejected the
argument that a capital defendant is entitled to counsel who is "death-
qualified." '361 Similarly, many states do not have the same guidelines
as the federal system.3
The "knowledge-gap" between capital and non-capital trials works
to the detriment of a military defendant. There is one major
difference between capital and non-capital courts-martial, the
requirement of unanimity.30 This difference affects the way military
defense attorneys conduct voir dire and presents a trap for the unwary
defense counsel. In Senior Airman Simoy's trial, defense counsel
used four challenges for cause and one peremptory to reduce the
panel's size from thirteen members to eight.-  This reduced the
chance Simoy had of receiving one vote against death. This difference
in rules is not present in the federal system. In either system it is
possible to receive an attorney inexperienced in capital trials,31 but in
the military an inexperienced lawyer is faced with a trap that could
lead to his client's execution. An incompetent military lawyer has one
more problem to worry about than an incompetent civilian lawyer.
An Article 32 hearing and a grand jury provide similar levels of
protection. A military defendant can put on a defense during the
hearing, 366 but if the charges are serious enough to possibly warrant
the death penalty, it seems unlikely that justice and discipline would
be furthered by an early acquittal. It seems more likely that a military
defense attorney would use this hearing to probe the prosecution's
case. This tactical advantage does not compensate for the tremendous
disadvantage posed by a defendant not having twelve people deciding
execution.
The appellate procedure may provide some safeguards and has
saved several soldiers from execution, but entrusting a person's life
and the reliability of the sentence to the military's two levels of
appellate courts is dangerous. The appellate procedure does not
provide a sufficient safeguard to offset a conviction and sentencing by
fewer than twelve people. Before a court hears an appeal, the
359. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27; Simoy, 46 MJ. at 619.
360. See supra text accompanying note 222.
361. United States v. Curtis, 44 M.J. 106, 126 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
362 See supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
363. See supra text accompanying note 115.
364. Sinoy, 46 MJ. at 625 (Morgan, J., concurring) (stating that defense counsel's
removal of four jurors almost amounted to ineffective counsel). It is unclear if Article
25a would remove this trap because the article does not state a quorum for capital
trials or a maximum on the number of panel members.
365. See supra Part II.C.4.
366. See supra Part II.C.2.
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convening authority, the SJA, and TJAG all examine the trial and the
sentence.367 However, where death is imposed, it is always at the
request of the convening authority. It seems unlikely the convening
authority would commute a sentence that he or she asked for. The
SJA is not a reliable safeguard because the office is part of the
prosecution; it is impossible for it to be completely unbiased. TJAG is
the only person in this chain who appears possibly neutral. TJAG's
review, however, is limited only to determining whether the law
supports the findings and sentence.3" TJAG does not examine for
errors committed in the trial.3 69 The Courts of Criminal Appeal
review cases presented to them by TJAG, the same office that
appoints judges to their benches.37 °
The need for twelve-member panels is specific to the issue of capital
punishment because death penalty prosecutions must adhere to a
higher standard of reliability than other punishments. The Supreme
Court has held that "death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.... There is a corresponding difference
in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case."371 The military's
prosecution of murder and rape committed in peacetime mandates an
increased reliability. The capital cases previously discussed did not
involve military crimes like spying or aiding the enemy, or even crimes
committed during war or rebellion where good order and discipline is
uniquely related. The crimes were non-military related murder,
committed in peacetime. Some did not even occur on a military
installation or involve a military victim. 372 While the murders were
horrible, soldiers should not receive less protection because of their
occupation. It is inexcusable to make it easier to put a person to death
merely because he or she is in the military. This dichotomy needs to
be remedied in the military system. Indeed, the government itself
conceded in Loving that civilian standards should be applied "in the
context of a conviction under Article 118 for murder committed in
peacetime within the United States. '373 If the military chooses to
prosecute soldiers for uniquely civilian crimes and put them to death,
then it should be held to the same reliability standards as the federal
system.
367. See supra Part II.D.1.
368. See supra text accompanying note 274.
369. See supra text accompanying note 274.
370. See United States v. Curtis, 38 M.J. 530 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1993); United
States v. Curtis, 28 M.J. 1074 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); supra text accompanying
notes 275-76.
371. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976).
372. Dwight Loving robbed a cab driver in a town in Kansas. United States v.
Loving, 34 M.J. 956, 959 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1992).
373. United States v. Loving, 517 U.S. 748,755 (1996).
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B. Failure To Make the Necessary Change
Drawing on historical analogy, this section argues that the NDAA
fails to guarantee twelve members in capital trials because the
language in Article 25a is ineffective and can be easily manipulated.
Section 582 of the NDAA attempts to require twelve members in
capital trials by adding article 25a to the UCMJ. To reiterate, it reads:
In a case in which the accused may be sentenced to a penalty of
death, the number of members shall not be less than 12, unless 12
members are not reasonably available because of physical conditions
or military exigencies, in which case the convening authority shall
specify a lesser number of members not less than five, and the court
may be assembled and the trial held with not less than the number
of members so specified. In such a case, the convening authority
shall make a detailed written statement, to be appended to the
record, stating why a greater number of members were not
reasonably available.374
Representative Ike Skelton, author of the amendment, noted that
all civilian capital trials have twelve jurors and said, "[o]ur servicemen
and women deserve no lesser standard." 5  He is correct but,
unfortunately, his amendment does not provide that standard. There
are four problems with Article 25a, all centering on exceptions to the
requirement of twelve. The first is the phrase "reasonably available,"
the second is the phrase "physical conditions," the third is the phrase
"military exigencies," and the fourth is the requirement of a "detailed
written statement."
The Articles of War, after their amendment in 1786 and before
their replacement in 1950, called for convening thirteen-members
panels only if it could be done "without manifest injury to the
service. 37 6  In 1827, a unanimous Supreme Court gutted this
requirement. The Court held that the decision on whether thirteen-
members panels could be convened without manifest injury was in the
sound discretion of the convening authority and was conclusive.'
After that ruling, manifest injury was merely a guide to the convening
authority but had no bite to it. When the UCMJ was written, the
phrase was discarded entirely. 78
The phrases "manifest injury to service" from the amendment in
1786 and "military exigencies" from the NDAA amendment have a
similar ring to them. If anything, the new standard is less stringent
than the old one. A "manifest injury" would require some sort of
374. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L No. 107-
107, § 582, 115 Stat. 1012, 1124 (2001).
375. Bonner, supra note 10.
376. American Articles of War of 1786, art 1, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40,
app. at 972; see also Sullivan, supra note 36, at 7.
377. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19,34-35 (1827).
378. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2000).
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damage whereas, according to Black's Law Dictionary, an exigency is
merely a "[d]emand, want [,or] need. '379 The other phrases from
Article 25a, "reasonably available" and "physical condition," are so
vague as to make one wonder if this could include the entire spectrum
of complicating circumstances from unique wartime demands to a
panel member having his car stolen and being unable to get to court.
The Supreme Court decision in 1827 would probably not bind the
Supreme Court because the UCMJ has replaced those Articles of
War. The new exceptions, though, are not stringent and so vaguely
worded that considering courts traditional deference to military
authority, a convening authority would have great leeway in selecting
the panel, leeway that could render the amendment almost completely
ineffectual. The final sentence of Article 25a, requiring a written
statement from the convening authority, also provides no guarantee
because there is no body appointed to review this statement nor any
standards to conduct such a review.
Even if all the linguistic loopholes previously mentioned were
interpreted so narrowly as to render them moot, there still exists the
possibility that after peremptory and causal challenges a panel of less
than twelve members could remain. As the law currently stands, new
members can only be added to the panel after assembly if the number
drops below the quorum during voir dire, currently five.38 The new
article does not make it clear if the quorum in capital cases is twelve.
Since twelve only need be impaneled if physical conditions and
military exigencies permit and five is the absolute minimum number,
it seems that five is still the quorum. This throws into question the
practicality of the amendment. What happens if fourteen members
are impaneled and five are removed through challenges, leaving only
nine? Does the trial proceed with only nine panel members but the
penalty can no longer be death? Or is the rule restricting appointing
new panel members a military exigency and the trial goes forward as
capital but with only nine jurors? If the second scenario is true then
the accused is no better off than before the amendment was passed.
The deck still remains stacked in the prosecution's favor. The
amendment is a laudable attempt to secure a basic civil right for
soldiers faced with possibility of death, a right that is extended to
every single civilian. But the loopholes, and the failure to define a
quorum, prevent the amendment from doing what it should.
379. Black's Law Dictionary 296 (5th. ed. 1983).
380. MCM, supra note 16, Rules for Court-Martial 505(c)(2)(B).
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C. Fixing Article 25a
1. How Article 25a Should be Fixed
This section evaluates which of the three branches of government is
best suited to remedy the military panel problem. Ultimately, this
section concludes it is necessary for Congress to amend Article 25a to
ensure defendants in military, capital trials for civilian crimes receive
the same protection as civilians. The next section suggests an addition
to Article 25a that would protect the accused in capital trials while
also maintaining the effectiveness of the military.
The Supreme Court cannot be relied upon to fix the defect for two
reasons. First, the new article will only cover offenses committed after
December 31, 2002. This means it could be ten years before the
Supreme Court rules on the amendment. Second, the Court is
unlikely to interpret the amendment narrowly. In the last twenty
years the Court has repeatedly refused to apply civilian protections to
the military. 1 The executive branch is also unlikely to offer any help.
President Bush could remedy the problem by refusing to approve any
executions until there is a solution. Given his track record in Texas,
this seems unlikely.' The President could change the rules for
replacing panel members before quorum is reached. This would be
similar to former President Reagan's creation of aggravating factors,
but this would only solve part of the problem. It would not close the
loopholes that Congress has left open.
The job of closing the loopholes lies with Congress. Only a
congressional amendment to Article 25a would be effective. The
amended article should require all capital trials for murder under
Article 118 and rape under Article 120(a) have twelve-member
panels. If for any reason a twelve-member panel cannot be
summoned, then the accused should be turned over to the civilian
authorities for trial. If the crime is committed overseas, the accused
381. The Supreme Court overruled a lower court's ruling that articles 133 and 134
of the UCMJ were overbroad. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758-59 (1974). Punitive
Article 133 makes "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" a crime and
Article 134 allows for prosecution of any offense that is detrimental to "good order
and discipline." Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 133-34. The trend against civil
liberties continued in Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1970). The Court held that
the constitutional right to counsel does not extend to a summary court-martial. Id. at
42. In Chappell v. Wallace, the Court held that:
The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the
consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of
military justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military
organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would
be unacceptable in a civilian setting.
462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983). See generally John F. O'Connor, The Origins and
Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 161, 262-306 (2000).
382. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
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should be transferred to another military installation capable of
handling the trial. The decision to turn over soldiers to civilian
authorities or to move them to another installation should not be in
the hands of the convening authority, but should be made by the
Secretary of Defense. This would ensure that under no circumstances
would an accused face the death penalty without twelve people sitting
in unanimous judgment. Additionally, Article 25a should be rewritten
to set the quorum at twelve. If any members were removed during
voir dire, new members could be assigned as needed, even after
assembly. Only legislation that mandates twelve-member panels and
gives no exception can ensure our country's service members are
afforded the same freedoms and protections they risk their lives to
defend.
2. Proposed Additional Language of Article 25a
I propose the following additional language be added to Article 25a:
In a case in which the accused may be sentenced to a penalty of
death and is charged with a violation of Article 118, Murder, and/or
Article 120(a), Rape, the number of panel members shall not be less
than 12. If 12 members cannot be assembled because of physical
conditions or military exigencies, the defendant will be handed over
for trial to the civilian jurisdiction where the crime occurred. If the
offense is committed outside the jurisdiction of a United States
court, the accused will be removed to another military installation
that will impanel twelve panel members. The decision for removal
to either a federal court or another military installation shall be
made by the Secretary of Defense upon a showing of physical
conditions or military exigencies.
This language would guarantee twelve people judge all service-
members in capital trials for civilian crimes. The proposed
amendment would also clearly state that the quorum for these capital
cases is twelve. New panel members could be added after assembly if
less than twelve remained after voir dire.
CONCLUSION
Military service members deserve the right to be judged by twelve
people in capital trials for civilian crimes. The historical precedents of
generally denying soldiers civilian protections and specifically denying
the right to a twelve-member trial are no longer applicable. The
creation of a system where a person can be sentenced to die by five
people for committing what is essentially a civilian crime demands a
heightened guarantee of reliability and fairness. The military system,
particularly in the way a panel is impaneled and in the way a defense
is conducted, does not create this guarantee. The discrepancy
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between federal capital trials and military capital trials needs to be
remedied.
Article 25a makes a laudable attempt to solve the problem but
ultimately fails. It contains too many loopholes and ineffective
language to secure soldiers the right to twelve-member panels.
Congress should pass an amendment that removes the loopholes and
makes the language more effective. This is the only way soldiers can
get what they deserve-the same chance as their civilian counterparts
to defend themselves and avoid execution.
Notes & Observations
